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†
 
In response to John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market:  The Impact of 
Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007). 
 
Professor John Coffee is one of the most insightful and imagina-
tive scholars of modern corporate finance, and I am delighted that he 
has turned his fertile mind to the study of enforcement in securities 
regulation.  On the view that extension is the sincerest form of flat-
tery, I am especially pleased to see that Professor Coffee has found my 
own earlier work on regulatory intensity as a useful starting point for 
aspects of his analysis.
1
 
When I first identified the striking differences in regulatory inten-
sity across jurisdictions, I had hoped that others would do just what 
Professor Coffee has attempted in his article:  refine my preliminary 
data and develop a better theoretical understanding of the signifi-
cance of variations of regulatory intensity for the quality of financial 
markets.
2
  Professor Coffee has made progress on both fronts.  His ar-
ticle introduces new data on formal enforcement actions and budgets 
in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia
3
—and makes a com-
pelling argument that the high level of enforcement activity in the 
United States explains, in part, why foreign issuers have been attracted 
to U.S. public capital markets in recent years and why some classes of 
foreign issuers still are.
4
  This second point has important policy im-
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plications for the ongoing debate over the competitiveness of U.S. fi-
nancial regulation, as it suggests that a relaxation of U.S. regulatory 
standards and a retreat from the SEC’s traditional emphasis on en-
forcement may in the long run actually reduce this country’s ability to 
compete for foreign listings and capital market dominance.
5
  The 
uniqueness of U.S. enforcement efforts that Professor Coffee identi-
fies also raises potentially serious questions about the wisdom of re-
cent proposals to accept foreign regulatory regimes as systems of sub-
stitute compliance for U.S. oversight of foreign exchanges and 
securities firms.
6
 
In a post-legal-realist world, the proposition that the law on the 
books does not fully capture the significance of legal regimes is un-
controversial.  The frequency with which laws are enforced and the 
consequences of successful enforcement actions quite plausibly have 
real economic consequences.  Thus, one might readily expect that fi-
nancial markets with stronger mechanisms for enforcing legal re-
quirements will behave differently than those financial markets in 
similar jurisdictions with identical legal requirements and less en-
forcement.  Hence, the core of Professor Coffee’s thesis—that higher 
levels of enforcement in the United States benefit U.S. financial mar-
kets—seems eminently reasonable.  But to validate this claim, one 
needs to devise an objective measure of enforcement efforts, and then 
(ideally) to undertake empirical tests of the relationship between that 
measure of enforcement and other measures of financial market per-
formance in a number of different settings. 
In this Response, I will touch briefly upon the not inconsiderable 
challenges confronting researchers seeking to confirm or rebut the 
claims that Professor Coffee advances.  There are substantial com-
plexities involved in comparing levels of international regulatory in-
tensity.  Moreover, the globalization of financial markets and the in-
creasing collaboration among regulatory bodies makes it even more 
difficult to structure clean tests of the impact of the supervisory efforts 
of individual countries.  While there are alternative mechanisms 
 
5
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whereby one could evaluate the efficacy of regulatory oversight, it is 
not clear which approach will generate the most meaningful results in 
validating Professor Coffee’s hypotheses that U.S. public enforcement 
provides a unique benefit to American markets and that lesser degrees 
of enforcement activity in other jurisdictions mean that their supervi-
sory approaches should not be considered acceptable substitutes for 
U.S. oversight. 
I.  CHALLENGES IN DEVISING OBJECTIVE MEASURES  
OF REGULATORY INTENSITY 
The two basic approaches that Professor Coffee and I have utilized 
to measure the regulatory intensity of supervisory regimes are regula-
tory inputs, such as staffing or budgets, and regulatory outputs, such 
as enforcement actions or monetary sanctions.  As Mark Roe and I 
have discussed elsewhere,
7
 each of these approaches has its advan-
tages, but both are also susceptible to a number of criticisms, which 
could be categorized as incompleteness, misdirection, and inadequate 
granularity. 
A.  Incompleteness 
No matter how one attempts to measure regulatory intensity 
across jurisdictions, there is always a concern that one has failed to 
identify all relevant regulatory inputs.  This problem is most apparent 
for staffing and budget measures, with the United Kingdom offering a 
good example.  While the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) is 
perhaps the premier example of a consolidated supervisory agency, 
the British actually maintain several other regulatory bodies that fulfill 
functions comparable to those of the U.S. SEC.  The British Financial 
Reporting Council employs a staff of fifty-five with a budget of £14.5 
million, polices auditing firms and the accounting statements of cor-
porate issuers, and undertakes activities comparable to those of the 
SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance and the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (PCAOB).
8
  The Panel on Takeovers and 
 
7
See generally Jackson & Roe, supra note 2 (comparing the merits of public and 
private securities regulation).  Another complexity not discussed in this Response is 
the need to make adjustments to account for economies of scale that likely occur in 
financial regulation based on market size and perhaps also the size and number of 
regulated firms. 
8
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United Kingdom 16-18, 22-23 (Nov. 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
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Mergers also plays an important role, somewhat comparable to the 
SEC’s with respect to proxy fights and tender offers.
9
  Regulatory 
comparisons that rely solely on FSA staffing or budget levels miss these 
other important regulatory components. 
The supervisory functions of stock exchanges also complicate 
comparative head counts.  In the United States, the supervisory activi-
ties of the NYSE and NASD have, for a number of years, been isolated 
in separate operational units, and are now fully removed into the Fi-
nancial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
10
  Around the world, 
the supervisory roles of exchanges have diminished with the demutu-
alization of all major exchanges and the dictates of EU listing direc-
tives.
11
  However, regulatory functions do still take place in many ex-
changes, especially with respect to the review of new listing 
applications, where exchange personnel often take on roles similar to, 
though invariably less intensive than, those of SEC staffers who review 
registration statements for IPOs.  The Hong Kong stock exchange’s 
oversight of new listings would be a good example of this role.
12
 
Finally, there is variation in the reliance that different regulators 
make of private assistance.  Within the German civil law tradition, this 
reliance seems particularly striking.  As Professor Coffee notes, Ger-
many’s BaFin makes use of outside audits to supplement regulatory 
oversight.
13
  The Swiss Federal Banking Commission makes even more 
extensive use of outside auditors, requiring them to undertake annual 
supplemental (and confidential) reports with respect to regulatory 
compliance.
14
  These reports are comparable to what the SEC’s Office 
of Compliance Inspections and Examinations might produce, but the 
Swiss personnel who undertake these reviews do not show up on gov-
ernment payrolls. 
Similar problems of completeness exist in collecting comprehen-
sive data on enforcement outputs.  For example, in evaluating en-
forcement efforts in the United Kingdom, one would want to consider 
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Id. at 13-15. 
10
Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators:  A Survey, 80 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1239, 1330-31 (2007). 
11
See id. at 1244-45 (discussing the impact of demutualization on regulator deci-
sion making). 
12
See id. at 1284 tbl.6, 1286 (detailing Hong Kong’s regulatory framework). 
13
Coffee, supra note 1, at 280-81. 
14
See Sweethaa Ballakrishnen et al., An Overview of Securities Enforcement in 
Switzerland 7 (Nov. 21, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describ-
ing the role of authorized outside auditors in the Swiss system). 
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both the oversight functions of the Financial Reporting Council men-
tioned above and also the Financial Ombudsman Service, which pro-
vides mediation services for a large number of matters each year,
15
 but 
whose enforcement actions are not included in the data reported in 
Professor Coffee’s article.  One should also probably take into account 
the predilection of some regulatory bodies to resolve enforcement ac-
tions informally and without public disclosure.  Again, this is a com-
mon practice for the British FSA, but it is also employed by many 
other jurisdictions, including, for example, Switzerland, where many 
enforcement actions are reported only on an anonymous basis.
16
 
B.  Misdirection 
By misdirection, I mean the possibility that both publicly reported 
regulatory resources and enforcement outputs may not actually be in-
tended to produce supervisory services.  To begin with, there is an ob-
vious question of whether all resources allocated to regulatory agen-
cies are in fact employed in bona fide supervisory functions, as 
opposed to serving as sinecures for cronies of political elites or posi-
tions from which to extract bribes and other economic rents.
17
  While 
all of the major financial centers of the world—the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Amster-
dam—do report above-average levels of regulatory staffing and budg-
ets, one can also find some more surprising jurisdictions (like Nigeria 
and Jordan) that report devoting substantial resources to regulatory 
agencies.  The possibility of graft and sinecures may produce nontriv-
ial levels of “noise” in measures of regulatory input, especially for 
samples that include the developing world. 
One might also imagine similar misdirection in reported en-
forcement activities, if, for example, financial sanctions were being 
imposed to penalize political opponents of the parties in power, or to 
punish industry participants for failing to pay bribes to regulatory offi-
cials.  While this may seem to be the kind of problem one would en-
counter in seriously corrupt jurisdictions, there is a possibility that the 
problem is more widespread.  In the United States, for example, the 
monetary penalties imposed earlier this decade by state authorities, 
led by former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, materially in-
 
15
Kirk & Ashimi, supra note 8, at 20, 31. 
16
See Ballakrishnen et al., supra note 14, at 17-18. 
17
See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND:  GOV-
ERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES 81-108 (1998) (examining the destructive 
impact of rent-seeking and corruption). 
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creased the level of overall U.S. monetary sanctions.
18
  The most un-
charitable critics of Mr. Spitzer claimed that these actions were pri-
marily designed to advance his own political ambitions;
19
 if true, the 
inclusion of these actions in aggregate U.S. data could confound 
analysis that proceeds on the assumption that all monetary sanctions 
are imposed to deter wrongful market behavior. 
C.  Inadequate Granularity 
One of the virtues of Professor Coffee’s analysis is that it attempts 
to provide greater granularity to the subject of regulatory inputs by 
examining the portion of regulatory staffs dedicated to enforcement 
activity.
20
  Extending his analysis, one could imagine decomposing the 
allocation of staffs into supervisory building blocks of rule formula-
tion, examination and inspection, enforcement, and other sectors.  
While one would face considerable challenges in assembling such 
data—currently regulatory agencies are remarkably eclectic in job 
classifications, and the lines between examination and enforcement 
often blur—the development of more refined staffing data would be 
of considerable interest.  One might, however, imagine other ways in 
which to subdivide regulatory personnel to generate equally interest-
ing granularity.  The professional backgrounds of regulatory person-
nel vary substantially across jurisdictions.  The SEC hires many lawyers 
and accountants; in contrast, the British FSA employs more econo-
mists and high-level staff drawn from industry ranks.  There are also 
differences in the extent to which regulatory personnel move back 
and forth between industry and government, as opposed to staying 
largely within a civil service path.  In addition, the degree to which 
regulatory personnel turns over with changes in political leadership 
also varies a good deal across jurisdictions.  It is not entirely clear 
which staffing divisions are most closely tied to strong financial mar-
 
18
See Jackson, supra note 2, at 280 tbl.3 (showing that monetary sanctions by state 
agencies between 2002 and 2004 accounted for slightly more than one-fifth of the total 
amount of public sanctions imposed in the United States). 
19
See, e.g., Posting of William J. Holstein to The Corner Office, Eliot Spitzer’s Leg-
acy on Trial, http://blogs.bnet.com/ceo/?p=1081 (Jan. 7, 2008, 06:31) (“[I]t was ob-
vious [Spitzer] was using his powers as attorney general to win the gubernatorial race 
in New York . . . .”).  Note, however, that Mr. Spitzer’s enforcement actions might still 
have had positive deterrent effects on financial misbehavior, even if the actions were 
partially motivated by personal advancement. 
20
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 272-73 (noting that despite similarities in staff-
ing and budgetary levels among the major regulators in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, “the United States punishes more severely”). 
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kets, but to the extent that staffing allocations are significant—an as-
sumption of Professor Coffee’s discussion of enforcement staffing lev-
els in the United States and Australia—then one might want to exam-
ine the relationship on multiple dimensions. 
Similar distinctions could also be made with respect to enforce-
ment actions and penalties.  In most jurisdictions, regulatory officials 
have jurisdiction over a wide range of activities—including the quality 
of corporate disclosures, insider trading and market manipulation, 
the sales practices of securities firms, and a host of technical rules re-
garding financial institutions’ solvency and the technical operation of 
markets.  The distribution of enforcement efforts varies a good deal 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with the SEC placing more emphasis 
on the review of disclosure documents and enforcement actions 
against other issuers than do other jurisdictions.
21
  And, of course, the 
incidence and distribution of private enforcement actions against 
both issuers and securities firms varies from country to country.  Ag-
gregate data about overall enforcement actions and sanctions may ob-
scure important differences across enforcement categories. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISMS OF ENFORCEMENT 
Even assuming one could assemble data, with an appropriate de-
gree of granularity, about the real resources allocated to legitimate 
public oversight of financial markets and the associated measures of 
formal enforcement actions, one might still be a long way from divin-
ing whether a particular jurisdiction’s level of regulatory intensity en-
sures an adequate level of compliance or sufficient oversight to foster 
robust capital markets.  The linkage between regulatory intensity and 
positive economic outputs is not well understood and may vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Consider, for example, the possibility that the regulated entities in 
one jurisdiction—think Sweden—are more apt to comply with newly 
promulgated legal rules than their counterparts in other jurisdic-
tions—say Italy.
22
  This commonly accepted stereotype of the North-
 
21
See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Regulatory Intensity in the Regulation of Capital Markets:  
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ERNIZE SECURITIES LEGISLATION IN CANADA, CANADA STEPS UP:  RESEARCH STUDIES:  
STRENGTHENING MARKET CREDIBILITY AND INTEGRITY 118-19, 120 fig.5 (2006), available 
at http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(2)%20Jackson.pdf (providing data showing that the 
SEC puts forth great effort to prosecute issuer-related violations). 
22
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scofflaws, prone to abusive practices and needing intensive and continuous oversight.  
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South European divide would imply that fewer enforcement actions 
are necessary in some jurisdictions than in others in order to generate 
the same impact on private market behavior.  One does not, however, 
need to posit transjurisdictional variation in inherent lawfulness in 
order to have concerns about the comparability of enforcement ef-
forts from one country to the next.  The means by which regulators 
enforce legal requirements may well differ materially around the 
world.  The light-touch regulation of the British FSA includes numer-
ous mechanisms of public-private exchange, ranging from the raised 
eyebrow on official Albion foreheads to the quite complex network of 
advisory committees and consultations that characterize British super-
visory practices.  Somewhat similar in effect is the use of informal 
guidance in Japan.  All of these alternative mechanisms of social con-
trol are plausible substitutes for the formal enforcement actions that 
characterize the regulatory activity in the United States and a few 
other jurisdictions.  The relative scarcity of enforcement actions in 
these other jurisdictions does not necessarily imply greater noncom-
pliance or economic drag. 
It is also important to examine the relationship between public 
enforcement efforts and private sanctions.  As Professor Coffee notes, 
private litigation in the United States often follows on the heels of 
public sanctions.
23
  And thus the significance of public enforcement 
efforts in the United States, as compared with the United Kingdom or 
Germany, may be even greater than the raw numbers suggest.  How-
ever, litigation may not be the only, or even the most, important pri-
vate response to public enforcement actions:  market movements in 
the form of price declines for shares and career consequences for im-
plicated individuals may be far greater.
24
  Plus, to the extent that viola-
 
Other populations may be more lawful . . . and hence less in need of supervisory over-
sight.”). 
23
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 275 (describing the “tendency for public and private 
penalties to be imposed on a cumulative and overlapping basis”); see also James D. Cox 
et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics:  An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 763 (2003) 
(finding that the defendants in 37 of 248 securities class actions had also been sued by 
the SEC). 
24
See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=652121 (stating that the largest monetary penalties for mis-
conduct are imposed by the market, not regulators or the courts); Jonathan M. Karpoff 
et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation 1-3 (Apr. 16, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=972607 (assert-
ing that shareholders sustain losses and culpable managers lose their jobs when com-
panies are accused of misconduct). 
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tors are public firms, the proxy process and voting power may impose 
additional sanctions on management.  At this stage, most of the work 
done on market reactions to public enforcement efforts has focused 
on U.S. markets; thus we do not know whether foreign markets im-
pose similar knock-on sanctions.  It is, however, conceivable that in 
some foreign jurisdictions private monitors do a better job of amplify-
ing public sanctions than do U.S. markets.  In London, for example, 
shareholders are said to have more power in the boardroom and so 
British investors may respond to FSA sanctions more effectively than 
their U.S. counterparts respond to SEC sanctions. 
III.  GLOBALIZATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Globalization also complicates comparative evaluations of en-
forcement data on many dimensions.  Cross-listed firms are one case 
in point.  If one considers the number of enforcement actions in Can-
ada and adjusts for the relative size of the Canadian market, one 
would likely conclude that the level of securities enforcement in Can-
ada is substantially lower than in the United States.  However, it turns 
out that quite a large number of leading Canadian firms are cross-
listed in the United States, and therefore are also subject to many U.S. 
regulatory requirements, supervisory standards (including exchange 
oversight), and even private liability rules.  Accordingly, the Canadian 
system of securities oversight does not constitute the entire universe of 
legal constraints on a major portion of the Canadian stock market.  
To some degree, Canadian securities markets free-ride off of U.S. 
regulatory intensity.
25
 
The increasing collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries 
complicates our evaluation of national regulatory efforts in other ways 
as well.  With the globalization of  financial markets, regulatory offi-
cials routinely refer matters to their counterparts in other jurisdic-
tions.  Often, a problem like insider trading or market manipulation 
will be detected in one market but will be referred to a second or 
third jurisdiction, where the investor making the trades or the firm in 
whose stock the trade is affected is located.  Referrals of this sort hap-
pen hundreds and perhaps even thousands of times each year, and 
 
25
See Jackson, supra note 21, at 97.  Alternatively, when one normalizes the 
amount of regulatory activity in Canada, one could reduce the market capitalization of 
Canadian domestic firms to account for the fact that the United States oversees some 
portion of that market capitalization.  Of course, one should then adjust upward the 
level of market capitalization of U.S. markets, at least for determining the effective 
level of U.S. market oversight.  Id. 
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greatly expand the investigatory powers and enforcement reach of na-
tional regulatory authorities.  For many jurisdictions, these coopera-
tive arrangements may substantially enhance their regulatory capacity 
beyond those suggested by the countries’ own supervisory forces. 
A similar point can be made about the development of new regu-
latory policies and legal standards.  In the past, such activities were 
largely conducted independently at the national level, with relatively 
little cross-border collaboration.  In recent times, however, a relatively 
small number of jurisdictions—the United States and the United 
Kingdom being the most prominent examples—have dedicated sub-
stantial resources to policy analysis and the development of new rules 
for emerging issues such as hedge funds and derivatives transactions, 
and then have shared their conclusions with other jurisdictions (often 
with the assistance of multilateral bodies, such as the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) or the Basel Com-
mittee, or regional treaty arrangements, such as the European Un-
ion).  As a result, smaller countries—even those with quite substantial 
financial markets—benefit from policy and rule development occur-
ring beyond their borders.  Analyses that focus solely on local re-
sources miss this important regulatory networking. 
IV.  HOW ELSE MIGHT WE MEASURE THE ADEQUACY OF REGULATORY 
INTENSITY? 
Let us now return to the key policy issues that Professor Coffee 
raised in his article.  How might we go about determining whether the 
United States or some other jurisdiction was devoting adequate re-
sources to supervising and policing financial markets?  While com-
parisons of regulatory staffing and budgets, or overviews of enforce-
ment intensity, may help identify instances where a country differs 
dramatically from international standards—as does the United States 
in the case of securities class action suits—these measures of regula-
tory inputs and outputs are likely to be too crude to make sharp dis-
tinctions across a wide range of jurisdictions, even if one could estab-
lish—as Mark Roe and I have attempted—that the allocation of 
greater resources to public enforcement is generally associated with 
more robust capital markets.
26
  What other measures of quality exist?  
In my view, there are two plausible, alternative approaches. 
 
26
See Jackson & Roe, supra note 2. 
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The first would focus on technical measures of financial perform-
ance.  With respect to corporate issuers, one might consider the cost 
of capital across jurisdictions on the assumption that if domestic firms 
within a jurisdiction can raise capital at reasonable prices, that juris-
diction must have a reasonably acceptable legal system to oversee the 
issuance of securities, or, at least, local markets must have developed 
adequate mechanisms to police serious agency costs by corporate in-
siders or controlling shareholders.  In a similar spirit, one could look 
to the behavior of trading markets—bid-ask spreads, price synchronic-
ity, and evidence of trading on inside information—to draw infer-
ences about regulatory quality.
27
  The evidence of equity premiums for 
cross-listed firms discussed in Professor Coffee’s article has similar 
probative value,
28
 but is potentially available for only a limited number 
of jurisdictions—the United States, the United Kingdom, and perhaps 
Hong Kong or Luxembourg—which attract substantial numbers of 
cross-listings.  The vast majority of national stock markets do not com-
pete for foreign listings, and are quite happy if they can simply retain 
their domestic firms. 
Another metric for evaluating financial markets can be found by 
examining the behavior of market participants.  This kind of evidence 
is often cited in the unfolding debate over U.S. capital market com-
petitiveness.  The declining number of new foreign listings and the 
spike of foreign firm deregistrations in the latter half of 2007 have 
been seen as evidence that American regulation has become too on-
erous.
29
  Conversely, one could see evidence of a rising number of new 
foreign listings as a measure of the quality of those markets that ac-
tively compete for foreign listings.  More widely applicable would be a 
market test based on the increasing presence in foreign markets of in-
stitutional investors (as well as retail investors) from the United States 
and other developed nations.  When sophisticated institutional inves-
tors make substantial investments in a country’s financial markets and 
depend on that market’s trading systems and support mechanisms, 
 
27
Some different technical measures would be necessary to assess the quality of 
broker-dealer interactions with their customers as well as that of asset managers, such 
as mutual funds.  One could, however, examine the costs of such intermediation ser-
vices and their impact on portfolio returns to draw inferences about the efficacy of 
regulatory controls. 
28
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 235-36 (noting that equity premiums for cross-listed 
firms occur only in the United States, which Professor Coffee attributes to the benefits 
of intense U.S. enforcement activity). 
29
See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE 
U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 3 (2007), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ 
The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf. 
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such as custodial services and clearing arrangements, that confidence 
represents another source of market-based information on the quality 
of foreign markets and may well have some probative value in cor-
roborating the quality of local regulation and legal regimes. 
CONCLUSION 
So what is to be done if we wish to gain better insight into the rela-
tive quality of regulatory systems?  The short answer, I think, is that no 
single approach will suffice.  Analysis of regulatory intensity—both in 
terms of regulatory inputs and outputs along the lines that Professor 
Coffee and I have both attempted—has undoubted value.  But one 
must be careful to draw the comparisons accurately with considerable 
attention to institutional variation across jurisdictions.  Confident 
normative judgments about the implications of observed variations in 
regulatory intensity should await empirical validation.  One should 
also consider evidence available from objective measures of quality 
that are more directly tied to financial performance, as well as the ad-
ditional information one can derive from observing how market par-
ticipants, both corporate issuers and sophisticated institutional inves-
tors, vote with their feet and their dollars. 
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